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One of the vibrant topics of debate among African and non-African scholars in the 20th and 21st 
centuries centered on the existence of African philosophy. This debate has been described as 
unnecessary. What is necessary is, if African philosophy exists, we should show it, do it and write it 
rather than talking about it, or engaging in endless talks about it. A popular position on the debate is 
that what is expected to be shown, done and written is philosophy tailored along the stereotyped and 
paradigmatic sense peculiar to Western Philosophy. Interestingly, a non-African scholar, Barry Hallen 
argues that using the method of ordinary language philosophy, African philosophy is philosophy per 
se, and should be recognised as such. The focus of this study is to analyse what Hallen refers to as 
ordinary language philosophy and explain how it authenticates African philosophy as unique ‘species’ 
of philosophy, thus, putting an end to the controversy on the ontology of African Philosophy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate on the existence of African philosophy, which 
is of central concern to most philosophers of the 20th and 
21st centuries, Africans and non-Africans alike, is accord-
ing to Makinde, unnecessary. What is necessary is, if 
African philosophy exists we should show it, do it and 
write it rather than talking about it, or engaging in endless 
talks about it (Makinde, 2007). As evident in the debate, 
what is expected to be shown, done and written is philo-
sophy tailored along the stereotyped and paradigmatic 
sense peculiar to Western philosophy. However, Hallen 
argues that using the method of ordinary language 
philosophy, African philosophy is philosophy per se, and 
should be recognised as such. The focus of this study is 
to analyse what Hallen refers to as ordinary language 
philosophy and explain how it authenticates African 
philosophy as unique ‘species’ of philosophy. In what 
follows, this work explores the use of language as a tool 
to understand the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, 
social and political beliefs and world-views of a human 
society. 
 
 
Language as a tool for understanding Human Society 
 
One of the peculiar and essential features that distinguish 
human beings from other species of beings that exist in 
the universe is language. As Pinker (1995) puts it, 
“language is the product of a well-engineered biological 
instinct”. Moreover, it is through it that human beings can 
shape events in each other’s brain with exquisite preci-
sion…simply by making ‘noises’ with our mouths, we can 
reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise 
in each other’s mind”. Different kinds of people, with 
different languages, cause their speakers to construe 
reality in different ways. Hence, as many as there are 
different kinds of human beings, there are different kinds 
of languages through which reality is being construed. It 
is in this respect that language, as a tool in the formation 
of metaphysical and epistemological ideas, developing 
social and moral consciousness of a people, becomes 
important. 
However, given the nature of language as “a complex, 
specialized skill which develops in the child sponta-
neously without conscious effort or formal instruction and is 
deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is 
qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from 
more general abilities to process information or behave 
intelligently” (Pinker, 1995). It follows that for language to 
serve as a pathway to understanding a people, its 
underlying logic must be made explicit. This is possible 
when the language is well understood, analyzed, and 
interpreted using the rules, logic  and  principles  that  are 
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are peculiar to the language itself. Through this analysis, 
some hidden facts about the people would be revealed. 
Moreover, analysis takes the language to a higher-level 
which stretches the reach of the language beyond its 
commonsensical boundary, thereby making it a technical, 
formalized and specialized enterprise. In this wise, one 
would need to learn the rule of the language for effective 
usage. The effect of this enterprise is that the conception 
of reality, knowledge, social and moral principles that 
guide a people would be different. In most cases, the 
agents of this technical, formal and special enterprise are 
alien to a language. In fact, the enterprise is, in most of 
the time, resisted. Despite this resistance, it naturally 
takes place.  
The effect of this transformation process, through which 
languages are subjected to formal analysis, interpretation 
and clarification and by which human beings view things 
differently, is also explicit in human thoughts and beliefs. 
In other words, human thoughts and beliefs, which are 
made explicit in languages that had undergone this 
transformation, are themselves refined. As it is argued by 
Horton (1967), Ruch(1974), Oruka (1975), Wiredu (1991) 
and Makinde (2007) to mention a few, traditional African 
languages are not subjected to formal analysis, 
interpretation and clarification. This explains why African 
thoughts, beliefs, world-views and their conceptions of 
reality are considered pre-rational, pre-logical, anti-scien-
tific and primitive. For some, it is on the basis of this non-
development of critical and analytical inclinations that the 
possibility of African philosophy is denied (Makinde, 2007 
and Wiredu, 1991). 
Hence, prior to the contemporary African scholars’ 
exemplary works or writings on what indeed qualified to 
be African philosophy, mere descriptive accounts and 
typical generalizations about ‘the traditional world-views 
of African people, which were predominantly communal 
and largely unwritten’(Oladipo, 2000) were taken as 
African philosophy. In fact, as Wiredu (1991) puts it, the 
conception of African Philosophy, which is largely 
christened ‘ethnophilosophy’, was “implicit in the life, 
thought and talk of the traditional African”. The statement 
of this conception of African philosophy is found in the 
works of Mbiti (1969), who notes that “‘African Philo-
sophy’ here refers to the understanding, attitude of mind, 
logic and perception behind the manner in which African 
peoples think, act or speak in different situations of life”. 
This is the conception of African philosophy challenged 
by Oruka (1975), who argues that ethnophilosophy is not 
philosophy because it does not meet some charac-
teristics, which constitute the neces-sary conditions in 
determining what is philosophy in the exact sense The 
position that ethnophilosophy is not worthy of being 
referred to as African Philosophy be-cause it is not an 
‘adequate fulfillment of philosophy’s historic function’ is 
also canvassed by Bodunrin (1981) Hountondji (1983) 
and Makinde (2007) to mention a few. Arising from this 
challenge is the debate on the possibility or otherwise of 
 
 
 
 
African philosophy, a debate that took the central stage in 
the larger part of 1970 all through to 1990. A new orien-
tation popular among the contemporary African philo-
sophers is based on the assumption that philosophy is ‘a 
rational and critical study of which argumentation and 
clarification are essential elements’ (Oladipo, 2000). 
Hence, since the documentation and records of African 
traditional thoughts, beliefs and world-views do not share 
these essential elements, they are not ‘African 
philosophy’. However, this does not suggest the denial of 
these thoughts, beliefs and world-views as non-existent. 
What is denied, according to Oladipo (2000), is “that the 
unanalytical narratives of these (thoughts, beliefs and 
world-views) given by the scholars of the first orientation 
in African philosophy can produce an authentic modern 
African philosophy”. 
The minimum requirement that would make African 
ethnophilosophy worthy of the name ‘philosophy’ is when 
it subjects African belief systems to careful interpretation, 
clarification, analysis and critical evaluation. Hence, 
African philosophy can only “be seen as growing out of a 
history of systematic reflection on widespread, pre-
reflective beliefs about the nature of humankind and its 
purposes; and about our knowledge of and our place in 
the cosmos” (Appiah,1992). In other words, it is when 
African traditional beliefs are subjected to systematic and 
critical analysis in which reasons and arguments play a 
central role that we speak of African philosophy. This 
marks the development of the analytic tradition in African 
philosophy. These analytical attributes include, but not 
limited to, what Wiredu (1989) describes as “the habit of 
exactness and rigour in thinking, (the pursuit of syste-
matic coherence) and experimental approach”. 
Notwithstanding this metaphilosophical issue of the 
existence and nature of African philosophy, there are 
concepts such as, beauty, being, causation, evil, God, 
good, illusion, justice, knowledge, life, meaning, mind, 
person, reality, truth, right, understanding, and wrong, 
used by Africans to express their views and convictions. 
These concepts need to be analysed and examined. 
These tasks are in the domains of critical and analytic 
philosophy. The point of the analytic approach to African 
philosophy is not really concerned with whether or not 
Africans are able to analyze and synthesize the tradi-
tional beliefs; “of course, there might not be in every 
society people who pursued a systematic critical concept-
tual inquiry, but at least in every culture there is work for 
a philosopher, should one come along, to do” (Appiah, 
1992). The point of the existence of analytic tradition in 
African Philosophy is that there are Africans, and non-
Africans alike, who have arisen to this challenge of pur-
suing a systematic conceptual inquiry. Given that most, if 
not all of the contemporary African intellectuals,who laid 
the foundation of analytic orientation in African philoso-
phy were all trained in the traditions of the West, the 
Western analytical framework and methodology is predo-
minantly used in redefining African  philosophical orienta- 
  
 
 
 
 tion. However, it is argued by some of these philoso-
phers that there is the need to establish a conceptual 
framework or a methodology characteristic of a philo-
sophy that would merit being considered African (Wright, 
1977). While for some, there is no need to search for a 
distinctively African conceptual framework or metho-
dology in the field of philosophy, the analytic orientation 
in African philosophy should follow the already esta-
blished analytical pattern exemplified in Western 
philosophy. The features of this well established syste-
matic aspects of Western philosophy according to 
Polycarp (1997) are: No reference to specific individual 
as sources of justificationIt studies individual view, not 
collective views, and confronts them   in terms of logical 
argumentation, intellectual discourse, and debate It 
depends on literacy and a system for writingIn this 
respect, what derives from the analyses and syntheses of 
African traditional thoughts, beliefs, world-views, 
concepts and ideas is that they are only philosophy if 
they pass through the scrutiny of formal philosophy, 
which “is characterized by universal rationality, mani-
fested in critical analysis, rigorous and abstract reasoning 
and argumentation” (Ikuenobe,1997). Granted that the 
tools of analysis are germane for the understanding of 
African world-views, thoughts and beliefs, the pertinent 
questions for Hallen are ‘with what method should this be 
done?’ Is it appropriate to use alien methods, using 
technical words and meanings which are foreign to 
African languages to analyze and clarify its concepts, 
synthezise its beliefs and conceptions of reality with “the 
habits of exactness and rigour in thinking, the pursuit of 
systematic coherence and experimental approach so 
characteristic of science?” (Ikuenobe 1997). Prior to 
Hallen, the only predominant answer to these questions 
is that there are Western standards and criteria which are 
not favourable to Africans. This is because Western 
languages, meanings and concepts, are used as 
paradigms of rationality to assess and evaluate African 
languages. Consequently, the apparent disparity between 
these two languages is taken to suggest illogicality and 
primitiveness of, of course, African languages. Whatever 
conception of reality, world-views, moral precincts and 
political systems built with these languages are regarded 
as pseudo. Hence, the analysis of how concepts are 
used in African languages and the metaphysical, episte-
mological, ethical and political beliefs and conceptions 
derived from such approach is not regarded as worthy of 
the title ‘philosophy’. This is evident in ‘the minimal, very 
minimal impression they have made upon the discipline 
of academic philosophy as a whole’ (Hallen, 1996,1998). 
African philosophers are therefore, being urged to 
urgently cultivate these virtues, “not just because they are 
in themselves intellectual virtues but also because they 
are necessary conditions of rapid modernisation.” 
(Ikuenobe, 1997).However, Hallen argues that the analy-
sis of how concepts are used in ordinary language is an 
essential methodology  of  analytic  philosophy.  Such  an  
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approach he maintains constitutes “African philosophy, in 
so far as it may deal with the analysis of African 
languages (or meanings) and the evaluation of African 
beliefs expressed in these languages” (Hallen, 2002). In 
his view, deriving a philosophy from African languages 
will not begin until we can correctly understand and 
translate the relevant meanings of concepts in ordinary 
African languages. In the next section, this work shall 
critically explicate Hallen’s method of ordinary language 
analysis, what it consists in, and how he puts it into 
practice in order to understand African beliefs, world-
views and conceptions of reality as embedded in their 
philosophy. Barry Hallen and the method of ordinary 
language analysis in African philosophyAccording to 
Hallen (1996), the thesis of an ordinary language philo-
sophy is characterized as follows: An emphasis upon 
ordinary, common and collective uses of language 
Greater importance being attached to description and to 
analysis rather than to criticismThe key words in the first 
feature of ordinary language philosophy, as italicized 
above, suggest that there are some other uses of 
language, which are not ordinary, common and collective. 
In this sense, usage of language follows some regimen-
ted or strictly controlled pattern. Any strange use of 
language that is contrary to this technical and strict sense 
of language is considered primitive, illogical and unrea-
sonable. What the ordinary language philosophy sug-
gests is that this strict and technical use of language, 
which is the feature of the mainstream philosophy, is not 
the only way of doing philosophy. As earlier asserted, 
language is a medium through which a people’s beliefs, 
thoughts, traditions, customs, etc., are made known. 
Hence, every constituent part of a people’s language 
counts if we are going to understand them. So every 
word, concept, sentence, etc., of a language is important 
and should be subjected to analysis, explication and 
clarification within the context of its use. This context 
would explain the background information and collective 
agreements that aid the description and analysis of the 
people in all its ramifications. The second feature of 
ordinary language philosophy removes what Polycarp 
calls the ‘formal’ or ‘universalists’ conception of philoso-
phy, in which philosophy is construed ‘as a systematic, 
rigorous, universal, and rational discipline’, in which 
conceptual analysis, criticis-- of philosophy. What Hallen 
advocates is that while these features of philosophy are, 
though acceptable, theyare not final. Philosophy would 
still accommodate description and analysis of beliefs, 
thoughts and tradition. Hallen (1985, 2001) believes, and 
justifiably so, that Africans have the “prerogatives to 
describe, analyse and define issues of rationality 
generally as they relate to Africa’s intellectual heritage”, 
and the products of utilizing these prerogatives are, in 
their own rights, philosophy. What this implies for Hallen 
is that, analytic African philosophers should chart a new 
course of doing philosophy or enact an alternative system 
of reasoning, which may be peculiar  to  analytic  African  
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philosophers and which can be developed into coherent 
and novel philosophical attitudes.In fact, there are arrays 
of philosophical articles and books written by African and 
non-African philosophers that underscore the points of 
these criteria of the method of ordinary language philoso-
phy. The kind of issues, for example, generated by the 
concept of ‘ori’ (in discussing human destiny) among 
scholars interested in the Yoruba metaphysical world 
views- suggest that embedded in ordinary, common and 
collective use of languages- are a number of overarching 
themes in specific areas of philosophy, such as episte-
mology, ethics, logic and metaphysics (Makinde, 1985, 
Gbadegesin and Segun, 1998). In the same manner, 
“utilizing source materials derived primarily from oral 
literature – proverbs, parables, divination verses, etc. – 
philosophers, situated for the most part in Africa, set out 
to analyse the meaning of a concept that occurs in an 
African language and that they believe to be of philo-
sophical prepossession and interest” (Hallen, 1998). In 
essence, without recourse to the rigorous critical and 
scientific approach of the West, African philosophers 
have analysed and described their metaphysical world-
views, epistemological and moral views.Hallen enume-
rates six specifics that encapsulate the details of the 
methodology and effects of ordinary language philosophy 
in analytic African philosophy. Each of them is critically 
explicated.The first is that “the study of ordinary-language 
usage would provide philosophers with an independent, 
empirical data-base from which to undertake the 
systematic analysis of African meanings” (Hallen, 1996). 
To start with, it may be correct to argue that if the method 
of ordinary language philosophy is applied to African 
philosophy, it would be possible to gather appropriate first 
hand data needed to locate the systematicity and rational 
texture of African philosophical thought. However, what 
sort of data would this be? Would it be different from the 
resources derived from some sort of technical usage of 
an African language – say Yoruba – such as proverbs, 
parables, divination verses and incantations? If the kinds 
of ‘independent and empirical data’ Hallen has in mind 
are what derive from these resources, this paper doubts 
whether mere analysis of ordinary and common Yoruba 
words, concepts and expression can help. This is 
because these kinds of technical usage of Yoruba words, 
concepts and expressions as the case in proverbs, 
parables, divination verses and incantations, etc., require 
some skill in mastering their usages and meanings. 
However, this study surmises Hallen’s point to be that if 
we pay close attention to some common and ordinary 
use of Yoruba words, concepts and expressions, apart 
from technical usages, it would reveal a collection of 
issues relating to metaphysics, epistemology, logic and 
ethics, which ordinarily are considered non-issues. For 
example, Hallen and Sodipo’s (1994) analysis of Yoruba 
words, such as ‘inu’, ‘ogbon’, ‘suuru’ and ‘ara’, in their 
discussion of ‘The keys to the structure of a Yoruba 
theory of the self’ opens up other interesting problematic  
 
 
 
 
issues that relate to the Yoruba understanding of the self, 
which were hitherto considered unproblematic. Moreover, 
until Makinde opened discussion on the philosophical 
implications – metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and 
even social and political – of the concept of ‘ori’, which 
features prominently in every Yoruba discourse on perso-
nality, hardly was it considered worthy of philosophical 
analysis. Again, an analysis of some words in Yoruba 
language, like ‘ní láti’, ‘gbódò’, in statements like ‘O 
gbodo lo’ or ‘O nilati lo’, reveals the inherent logical 
implication of ‘mustness’ or ‘necessity’ in the usage of the 
words, which may not be explicit to a potential Yoruba 
speaker (Adewole, 1990,1991). Hence, if the assump-
tions, beliefs, and sometimes common sentiments that 
underlie every word, every concept, and every expres-
sion in a language is subjected to analysis, it will be 
evident that there are embedded in the language many 
issues that are capable of engaging a philosopher.  
However, it could be argued that when, as a result of 
analysis, the assumptions, beliefs and all sorts of senti-
ments (ranging from cultural to traditional) that underlie 
the meaning and usage of an ordinary language are 
understood, it is possible that the meanings of a word, a 
concept or an expression derived when it is subjected to 
the method of analysis could only accentuate the peculiar 
meanings and usage of such words, concepts and 
expressions for the particular users of the language. It is 
possible that this peculiar meaning could be strange 
when compared with some standards of meaning and 
other paradigms of rationality. However, this study 
supposes that for Hallen, this would not be a problem. 
This is because this relativity reveals facts about the 
indigenous and independent conception of reality, beliefs 
about the existence and nature of the universe, etc, 
which are peculiar to the people whose language is being 
studied. In fact, as Hallen (1996) notes in relation to 
African languages, “standard of verification, moral 
paradigms, aesthetic criteria embodied in and expressed 
by discourse in an African language – all provide 
examples of the human genius that invents languages 
and thereby imposes empirical and theoretical  
order on immediate experience”. Hence, an African is 
entitled to invent her own meanings and usages, which 
might be peculiar to her.One question that may arise from 
the study and analysis of ordinary, common and 
collective usage of an African language could be: ‘what is 
the essence of raising problems where there is seemingly 
none?’ For example, hardly would anyone raise any 
question if a Yoruba person attributes his or her success 
in an endeavour to his or her ‘good ori’. However, when 
we begin to analyse the concept of ‘ori’, a seemingly 
unproblematic concept becomes so entangled with many 
philosophical issues that make it difficult to use the 
concept without thinking twice. The question is – what is 
the use of a method that finds problems where there are 
none, and thereby impair communication and under-
standing among  people?  In  other words, the method of  
  
 
 
 
ordinary language analysis will introduce into a language, 
which is seemingly problem free, some traditional pro-
blems of philosophy that raise questions on some of the 
unquestioned common assumptions, beliefs and senti-
ments that aid agreement, communication and social 
relations in the society. For the method to be adequate, it 
could be said that it ought to proffer solutions to an 
existing problem and not create new ones. However, I 
think Hallen’s second specifics of the ordinary language 
philosophy takes care of this concern. This is that ‘as 
once was the case with English-language and ordinary-
language philosophy, there need be no presumption that 
this kind of study will either solve or dissolve the 
traditional problems of philosophy.’ It is not important that 
the method of ordinary language philosophy is able to 
solve problems. Apart from the fact that discussions and 
analyses of the ordinary language being philosophical in 
their own right (which is the position being canvassed by 
Hallen), “the conscious attempts at analysis, criticism and 
systematization is also called philosophy and the men 
who are concerned with that activity are called philoso-
phers.” What Hallen wishes to establish is that contrary to 
popular opinion that only the latter qualifies as philo-
sophy, both are methods of doing philosophy. As pointed 
out by Hallen, one of the reasons why what is said to 
‘constitute a significant part of analytic African philosophy 
today has been ignored’ is because it is adjudged to be 
nothing but mere anthropological descriptions, analyses 
and evaluations. However, this discourse assumes that 
Hallen is right to argue that this erroneous judgment is 
arrived at because the mainstream philosophers do not 
appreciate the rich African resources upon which they 
base their discourse. In other words, the western para-
digms of rationality and/or of philosophy are considered 
ubiquitous, and are used to rank African discourse 
‘relatively low on the cross-cultural comparative scale’. In 
other words, what this study assumes is that, Hallen 
hopes to show with the focus on the role and value of 
ordinary language analysis in the African context is not 
that Africans should embrace ethnophilosophy as African 
Philosophy simpliciter, but that it will serve “as a tool that 
will enable philosophers to come to terms with pieces or 
portions of African fields of discourse.” Hence, following 
the lead of ordinary language analysis, philosophers are 
able to appreciate that ‘traditional thought systems (and a 
host of other beliefs and values, which had been des-
cribed as ‘precritical, prereflective, prelogical, prescientific 
and proto-rational etc’) and as well can be a source of 
critical (…), speculative hypotheses about certain 
common human situations, institutions and problems that 
should be of interest to the academic philosopher.” This 
is ordinary and common words, concepts and expres-
sions used in packaging and presenting the beliefs, 
values and cognition of a people, are made accessible 
and acceptable to philosophers. 
Moreover, in an attempt to correctly analyze a lan-
guage, it is important to  identify  and  be  guided  by  the  
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essential vocabulary, paradigm cases, examples of 
correct and incorrect usage, empirical content and criteria 
for the correct application of a term etc which is peculiar 
to the language. With this in place, “philosophers would 
have at their disposal systematic, rather technical and 
fairly rigorous guidelines for the analysis in their own right 
(and for the translation into English, etc) of African 
meanings”. This discourse further assumes that Hallen 
fell back into this unjustified mentality of translating lan-
guages to English as a test of acceptability. The fact that 
there are Yoruba words, which if translated to English 
would have more than one meaning, and would alter the 
immediate meaning, usage and understanding suggests 
that in studying an ordinary language, it is not really 
necessary to translate into English language. However, 
the fact that there are some deep senses of meaning, 
usage and understanding of ordinary and commonly used 
Yoruba concepts like ‘inù jìn’, ‘ènìyàn’ and ‘ayé’ etc, 
which suggest that there are some kind of technicalities 
of the language, which if not mastered by a non-native 
speaker, would inhibit philosophical discourse in the 
language, potentiates the need to study Yoruba language 
in just the way it is used in the ordinary and common 
sense.  
As Hallen rightly observes, “most of the existent 
philosophical analyses of individual concepts in African 
languages take their source and reference materials from 
oral literature – a concept as it occurs in proverbs, para-
bles, poetry and divination verses etc.” This trend sug-
gests that oral literature is the only source of data or 
materials that is worthy of philosophical discourse in 
Africa. However, using Hallen’s The Good, the Bad and 
the Beautifulas as case study, Doris notes that Hallen still 
believes that “we must look to “ordinary language” – and 
not to the vaunted discourses of myth or the luminous 
surfaces of Yoruba art objects – if we hope to locate the 
systematicity and rational texture of Yoruba philosophical 
thought”. In the same work, Hallen amply demonstrates 
that “on the level of everyday experience, Yoruba discou- 
-rse in its own right reveals itself to be conventionally 
commonsensical, rational, and empirical.” Hence, intro-
ducing a methodology that places its emphasis directly 
upon the use of the concept in the ‘give and take’ 
discourse or the everyday use of language should ‘ena-
ble philosophers to site in the field of discourse (or 
conceptual network) of which it is a part and thereby to 
identify more clearly the criteria governing usage’.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On the whole, when concerned with ordinary language, 
“we are concerned primarily with the language we all  
speak in our everyday living, and surely we would ordi-
narily speak.” Hence, what the ordinary language philo-
sophy canvasses is that philosophy should not be limited 
to the rigorous, critical and technical activities that cha-
racterize  Western  philosophy.  In fact,  it  is when a peo- 
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ple’s beliefs, world-views and positions, expressed 
through ordinary language are accessed and assessed 
through philosophical technicalities that are alien to the 
people that such beliefs, world-views and positions are 
considered mistaken. It is on this basis that Hallen denies 
a common mode of cognition, and canvasses an African 
system of cognition peculiar to them. In fact, he warns 
that “if one of the responsibilities of African philosophy 
today is to re-evaluate the intellectual heritage of Africa’s 
indigenous cultures, then this study would also advocate 
that it frees itself from this cross-cultural rational standard 
which is so indisputably of Western origin”. The point is 
that ordinary language philosophy enables looking 
inwardly in order to appreciate and explore the invaluable 
and inestimable philosophical data inherent and peculiar 
to the language which, if subjected to description and 
analysis, can be developed into coherent, unique and 
novel philosophical ideas and ideals. Hallen in most of his 
writings, shows that there are enough philosophical 
issues and some solutions to most philosophical pro-
blems in indigenous African systems of cognition, which 
are embodied in African languages.  
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